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This chapter discusses how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has used judgments 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its legal reasoning. The CJEU uses ICJ jurisprudence in 
three main ways: when discussing customary international law, when applying the law of treaties, 
and when using international law to interpret and develop principles of EU law. The chapter reviews 
the cases in which the CJEU and the Advocates General have discussed ICJ cases, including areas of 
international humanitarian law, diplomatic and consular law, nationality and citizenship, the law of 
the sea, and the international law of treaties. On the one hand, the CJEU’s use of ICJ case law may 
show its commitment to the universality and coherence of international law. However, the CJEU also 
has a strong commitment to the coherence and unity of EU law, and has emphasised the autonomy of 
the EU legal order. The chapter shows that, upon closer inspection, the CJEU interprets and applies 
ICJ jurisprudence through an EU law prism. It also shows that, over time, principles of international 
law are transformed into principles of EU law. In these instances, the CJEU no longer refers to 
ICJ/PCIJ jurisprudence, but as autonomous EU law principles. ICJ jurisprudence is used to fill gaps, 
or to support certain legal arguments, but it is not followed as if it were a hierarchically superior court. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The International Court of Justice, housed at the Peace Palace in The Hague, and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, just over 300 kilometres south in Luxembourg, are two very different types 
of international court. As the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”,1 the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) is truly a ‘world court’. It resolves legal disputes submitted to it through its 
contentious jurisdiction, and answers legal questions submitted to it through its advisory jurisdiction. 
Through these judgments and opinions, the ICJ also contributes to the universal character of 
international law. For instance, the ICJ has consistently upheld that international law is a single 
system that applies to all states, comprised of a set of universal rules.2  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which includes the Court of Justice (CJ) and the 
General Court (GC), is the court of a regional supranational organization, the European Union. Many 
would argue that the CJEU should not be considered an international court at all, and that it more 
closely resembles a constitutional court for Europe. While its primary goal is to interpret and apply 
the two founding EU Treaties and EU law, its everyday practice appears to resemble a domestic court. 
On a given day, it might hear cases on copyright protection, competition law, the freedom of 
movement, or the law governing the EU institutions. This contrasts with the work of the ICJ, dealing 
                                                 
1 Art. 92, Charter of the United Nations.  
2 See M. Andenas & E. Bjorge (eds), ‘Introduction: from fragmentation to convergence in international law’ in A Farewell 
to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) “the 
International Court has in this way not only shown that international law is a single, unified system of law but, in doing 
so, reasserted its own position in this system, that is, at the centre of the international legal system.”  
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with issues such as maritime delimitation, armed conflict, or the legality of nuclear weapons. Whereas 
the ICJ has jurisdiction to resolve issues of international law between states, the CJEU has a narrower 
role, that is, to resolve disputes regarding EU law. Whereas the ICJ must wait for states to submit 
cases and UN organs to submit requests for advisory opinions, the CJEU has compulsory jurisdiction, 
and can hear cases brought by the EU institutions, EU Member States, and certain individuals. Just 
as the ICJ promotes the universal character of international law, the CJEU has also been instrumental 
in promoting the coherence of EU law, particularly by promoting the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
It may appear, based on these differences, that the two courts operate in entirely separate worlds. The 
ICJ faces legal issues on the plane of international law and disputes between states, whereas the CJEU 
is focused primarily on EU law. Yet over time, there has been much more interaction between 
Luxembourg and The Hague. These two Courts, both based in Europe, and both born out of war on 
that continent, are committed to the project of promoting peace. Moreover, the courts have both faced 
similar and overlapping legal issues.  
This chapter examines this relationship between these two international courts. It focuses primarily 
on how the CJEU has dealt with ICJ jurisprudence, by discussing CJEU judgments and Advocate 
General opinions that have referred to or cited ICJ judgments. The CJEU deals with the ICJ 
judgements in three main ways: when discussing customary international law, when applying the law 
of treaties, and when using international law to interpret and develop principles of EU law. These 
three issues overlap. For example, the CJEU applies the principles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as a source of customary international law, and by doing so, develops 
internal EU law on the way that the EU law and international law sources interact. 
The ICJ has had an important role in establishing and clarifying principles of international law, and 
in so doing promotes the coherence, even universality, of that system.3 One might expect, then, that 
the CJEU would show a certain deference to the ICJ when dealing with issues of international law. 
Yet this is not always the case. At times, the CJEU appears open to citing ICJ authority. But the CJEU 
also shows a certain boldness. It may appear to follow ICJ case law, but do it in a way that diverges 
from it in some respects. For example, in a rather subtle manner, it may cite an ICJ judgment to 
support a proposition, but go further than the ICJ did in that judgment. In other instances, the CJEU 
does not refer to ICJ jurisprudence. The CJEU is, first and foremost, a court of the EU, and when it 
applies ICJ case law, it does so in order to interpret and apply EU law. The CJEU therefore views the 
                                                 
3 B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ 20 European Journal of 
International Law 2 (2009) 265–297. M. Andenas and E. Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation Reassertion and 
Convergence in International Law (CUP, 2015). 
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ICJ’s case law as a secondary source of law in the EU legal order. It is capable of informing the CJEU 
when dealing with international law issues, but is by no means viewed as a superior court. 
The following sections discuss how the CJEU has dealt with ICJ jurisprudence. It examines the 
judgments and opinions of Advocates General that mention the international court and its case law.4 
It does not discuss, however, instances where the CJEU had a chance to refer to an ICJ case but did 
not do so. It therefore only examines instances where the CJEU chose to refer to the ICJ. It may have 
done this upon its own initiative, or because, the parties made references to ICJ case law in their 
arguments and submissions.  
Whereas the CJEU sometimes cites and discusses ICJ judgments, the reverse is not the case. It is 
unlikely that the ICJ would discuss CJEU judgments unless a question arose regarding EU law. Yet, 
because the EU Treaties forbid the EU Member States from submitting disputes related to EU law to 
any judicial body other than the CJEU, it is very unlikely that the ICJ would ever hear such a dispute.5 
If an EU Member State were to bring proceedings before the ICJ that touched upon EU law, the 
European Commission would almost certainly bring infringement proceedings against that state. For 
instance, in the Mox Plant case, the CJEU found that Ireland breached its obligations under Article 
292 TEC (now Art. 344 TFEU) by submitting a dispute against the UK that would have involved the 
interpretation of EU law.6 While the arbitral tribunal considered that it had prima facie jurisdiction, 
it noted that the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom before the ECJ would be binding 
under EU law, and may lead to conflicting decisions. The Tribunal decided to suspend the 
proceedings.7 
The ICJ’s docket once featured a number of European States, and some of its landmark cases dealt 
with countries that are now members of the European Union.8 In later decades, the ICJ’s cases have 
dealt with countries outside Europe. EU membership has arguably made the use of the ICJ between 
Member States less likely. It is only in cases where there is no EU law dimension, such as the dispute 
                                                 
4 The chapter does not discuss instances where references to the ICJ were incidental or minor.  
5 Judgment in Commission v. Ireland, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345 (‘MOX Plant’). 
6 Judgment in Commission v. Ireland, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345 (‘MOX Plant’). 
7 President’s Statement of June 13, 2003, Ireland v. United Kingdom <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148>, para. 11. “The Tribunal considers that a situation in which there might be two 
conflicting decisions on the same issues would not be helpful to the resolution of this international dispute. Nor would 
such a situation be in accord with the dictates of mutual respect and comity that should exist between judicial institutions 
deciding on rights and obligations as between States, and entrusted with the function of assisting States in the peaceful 
settlement of disputes that arise between them.” 
8 E.g. Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain) 
(Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3; Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) (Preliminary Question) [1954] ICJ Rep 19; North Sea 
Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Merits) 
[1969] ICJ Rep 4.  
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between Italy and Germany in Jurisdictional Immunities, where EU Member States brought 
proceedings against one another. Even in this case, Germany made a declaration stating that the 
dispute did not involve an EU law dimension.9 When Belgium instituted proceedings against 
Switzerland in Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Belgium v. Switzerland), a case involving the interpretation and application of the Lugano 
Convention, Belgium declared that the Court of Justice of the European Communities “is without 
jurisdiction in the area”.10 Although Belgium discontinued proceedings in this case, Hoffmeister 
argues that any ICJ judgment “would have dealt with a matter which had become a matter of Union 
law under the revised 2007 Lugano Convention” since the CJEU had found that it is exclusively 
competent in the field covered by the Lugano Convention.11 
Although it is not a UN member or a party to the ICJ Statute, the European Union could potentially 
appear before the ICJ in some proceedings. The EU often appears in various international dispute 
settlement bodies, either as a party to the proceedings, or to brief a tribunal on issues of EU law. Yet 
it has never appeared before the ICJ. Hoffmeister has discussed the possibility of the EU appearing 
before the ICJ via Article 43(2) of the ICJ’s Rules of Court.12 The European Union may also give 
information to the Court in the context of advisory proceedings. For instance, on 18 January 2018 the 
ICJ found that the African Union would be able to furnish information to the Court regarding the 
question submitted to the ICJ for an advisory opinion in Legal consequences of the separation of the 
Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.13 
2 The CJEU and International Law 
 
                                                 
9 ICJ Press Release No. 2008/44 of 23 December 2008, 2: “Germany asserts that, although the present case is between 
two Member States of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg has no 
jurisdiction to entertain it, since the dispute is not governed by any of the jurisdictional clauses in the treaties on European 
integration. It adds that outside of that “specific framework” the Member States “continue to live with one another under 
the regime of general international law.” 
10 ICJ Press Release 2009/36, 22 December 2009, 2. 
11 F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes’ 11 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 1 (2012) 85. 
12 F. Hoffmeister, supra note 11, 77. Article 43 (2) ICJ Rules of Court: “Whenever the construction of a convention to 
which a public international organization is a party may be in question in a case before the Court, the Court shall consider 
whether the Registrar shall so notify the public international organization concerned. Every public international 
organization notified by the Registrar may submit its observations on the particular provisions of the convention the 
construction of which is in question in the case.” 
13 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, 25 
February 2019, para. 7. By an Order dated 17 January, 2018, the ICJ  decided that the African Union was likely to be able 
to furnish information on the questions submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion 
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In order to understand the CJEU’s relationship with the International Court of Justice, it is important 
to discuss the CJEU’s relationship with international law. The relationship between the CJEU and 
international law is a complex issue, and has been subject to quite some academic discussion in recent 
years.  The starting point is that the CJEU does not consider the EU Treaties to be part of the 
international legal order. Although the EU’s founding documents are strictly treaties from the 
perspective of public international law, the CJEU has held that when establishing the European 
Communities, the EU Member States created a ‘new legal order’.14 This has had an effect on the way 
the CJEU approaches other international law instruments. In order for the CJEU to apply and interpret 
international law, it must have ‘entered’ the EU legal order. In terms of hierarchy, then, international 
law is binding on the Union, but is considered as sitting between primary EU law (the EU Treaties, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and general principles of EU Law) and EU secondary law (EU 
Directive, Regulations). Moreover, the CJEU has set out certain conditions under which international 
law may enter the EU legal order.  
Judge Rosalyn Higgins contrasts the CJEU’s approach to international law with that of the European 
Court of Human Rights.15 The CJEU views EU law, not as a specialised form of international law, 
but as an autonomous legal order. Contrast this with the ECtHR, which views its role as interpreting 
a specialised field of international law, that is, the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
ECtHR will therefore seek to interpret and apply the Convention in accordance with other principles 
of international law. This is in stark contrast to the CJEU, which will not use international law to 
interpret the EU Treaties. For instance, the CJEU has applied the principles of the 1969 VCLT to 
interpret international agreements, but does not apply such principles when interpreting the EU 
Treaties themselves.  
The CJEU deals with international law in two main ways. The first is when international law is dealt 
with as part of the EU legal order. When the EU adopts an act, “it is bound to observe international 
law in its entirety, including customary international law, which is binding upon the institutions of 
the European Union”.16 This is based on Article 3(5) TEU, according to which the Union is to 
contribute to the strict observance and the development of international law. International law that is 
binding on the EU is considered to be part of the EU legal order. In these instances, the CJEU might 
                                                 
14 Judgment of 5 February 1963 in van Gend & Loos, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1, 12. 
15 R. Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law’ 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
1 (2003) 1, 6. 
16 Judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, C-
366/10, EU:C:2011:864 , para. 101. 
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be called upon to decide whether a particular EU instrument is compatible with rules of international 
law, both treaties and customary international law.  
The second is where the CJEU is called upon to answer questions of public international law that 
arise when interpreting and applying EU law. In the latter scenario, international law is not used as a 
sword to challenge the legality of an EU law instrument, but as a tool in the Court’s reasoning. The 
CJEU’s approach to international law, and its use of ICJ jurisprudence, depends on whether it is using 
international law in the first method, reviewing the legality of EU acts, or in the second method, using 
international law to support its reasoning. When international law is a tool to interpret and apply EU 
law, the CJEU has been quite open to the use of ICJ jurisprudence. Higgins points out that “[t]he 
purposes for which Public International Law is involved before the European Court are various and 
interesting.  And it is fascinating for an international lawyer to see, through the prism of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court, the place of Public International Law in the legal disputes of 
the Community.”17  The following sections discuss how the CJEU has dealt with ICJ jurisprudence. 
It shows that the CJEU often uses the ICJ jurisprudence as a short cut route to discover international 
law rules, but rarely engages with the reasoning of the ICJ judgments.  
 
3 Customary International Law 
 
The main way that the CJEU has dealt with ICJ jurisprudence is in order to identify principles of 
customary international law.  The CJEU has held that the EU must respect international law in the 
exercise of its powers, including customary international law, yet it may not always be clear whether 
a particular principle has the status of customary international law. First, it uses ICJ jurisprudence as 
a ‘short-route’ to find the existence of a principle of customary international law.18 The CJEU does 
not usually undertake an independent analysis of whether a particular principle has the status of 
customary international law, by looking, for instance at whether state practice and opinio juris support 
the customary character of a rule. Rather, it will usually refer to a case of the ICJ or PCIJ. There are 
a number of fields of public international law where the CJEU has cited ICJ jurisprudence regarding 
customary international law. 
                                                 
17 Higgins, supra note 15, 6. 
18 “[T]he International Court of Justice’s findings as a useful short-route to identifying what customary international law 
on a given topic may be.” Higgins, supra 15, 10. 
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3.1 International Humanitarian Law 
 
The CJEU has encountered ICJ jurisprudence in cases dealing with international humanitarian law 
(IHL). For instance, it has discussed how common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol 
I have the status of customary international law. In A and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,19 
Advocate General Sharpston referred to the Nicaragua v United States and the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion.20 Nicaragua is cited to support the argument that the rules in common Article 3 
reflect customary international law, which ‘constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more 
elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts’ and that they reflect ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’.21 In this case, A and Others argued that Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) could not be classified as a terrorist organization under EU law, because it was 
engaged in an ‘armed conflict’, within the meaning of international humanitarian law, with the Sri 
Lankan government. AG Sharpston found that international humanitarian law does not prohibit the 
adoption of preventative measures of the type to which LTTE was subject. The Court did not mention 
the ICJ, however. It found that international humanitarian law and the EU law provisions in question, 
pursue different aims and introduce different mechanisms. Referring to its earlier ruling in Diakité, 
the Court found that the application of the Common Position and Regulation in question do not 
depend on classifications stemming from international humanitarian law.22 Like in Diakité, the Court 
found that IHL and EU law exist in separate spheres of operation.  
In Diakité, AG Mengozzi similarly cited the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion to assert that the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols constitute 
‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’.23 The Advisory Opinion was also cited 
the ICJ when discussing how IHL constitutes one complex system comprising of ‘Hague law’ and 
‘Geneva law’.24 The Advocate General did so in order to make the point that, even though those 
instruments are not binding upon the Union, they represent customary law, and as such are binding 
on the EU, and that EU law should therefore be interpreted consistently with those rules. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
19 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, A and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, EU:C:2016:734.  
20 ICJ, Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, paras 78 and 79, 
cited at footnote 5, A and Others, supra note 19. 
21 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paragraphs 218 and 219, cited at footnote 92, A and Others, supra note 19. 
22 Judgment in A and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, EU:C:2017:202, para. 91.  
23 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, 
paragraph 79; cited by in Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C‑285/12 Aboubacar Diakité 
V Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, EU:C:2013:500, at footnote 24. 
24 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, supra note 23, para 29. 
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the AG and the Court found that the meaning of ‘internal armed conflict’ in the Qualification 
Directive did not have same meaning as a ‘non-international armed conflict’ under IHL. One might 
make the argument that Diakité contributes to a form of fragmentation here, since they both take a 
different approach the notion of an armed conflict that is not international in character. However, here 
the EU law in question and the relevant IHL provisions do have very different purposes and aims. 
Although they use similar terms, they are used for very different purposes.25 
In Joined Cases T‑208/11 and T‑508/11, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),26 LTTE argued 
that placing LTTE on a list relating to freezing of funds violates the ‘principle of non-interference’ 
under IHL, by constituting an interference with a third country in an armed conflict. The CJEU 
quickly dismissed this argument. While it found the principle of non-interference exists, referring to 
the ICJ’s Nicuragua judgment,27 it found that the principle is set out for the benefit of sovereign states 
“and not for the benefit of groups or movements.”28 
In Kadi, perhaps the most well-known CJEU judgment involving international law, there is very little 
engagement with the ICJ. However, Advocate General Maduro made passing reference to the 
Lockerbie case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, Provisional Measures) to support the 
argument that Article 103 of the UN Charter applies to binding decisions of the UN Security 
Council.29 The Court of First Instance (as it then was) also made a number of references to ICJ 
judgments, including Lockerbie,30 to support the primacy of resolutions of the UN Security Council. 
In that case, the Court of First Instance found that it had the power to conduct, ‘indirect judicial 
review’ of UN Security Council resolutions, limited to violations of jus cogens norms. In making this 
argument, the Court of First Instance referred to the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, to 
support the idea that jus cogens norms constitute “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law” from which neither the Member States nor the UN bodies may derogate.31 
 
                                                 
25 See further, J. Odermatt, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court?’ 3 Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 3 (2014) 696, 714. 
26 Judgment in T-208/11 - LTTE v Council, EU:T:2014:885. 
27 LTTE v Council, supra note 26, para 69. 
28 LTTE v Council, supra note 26, para 69. 
29 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, C-415/05 P Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:30, para 18. 
30 Judgment in T-315/01 - Kadi v Council and Commission, EU:T:2005:332. In particular, the CFI referred (at para 184) 
to Order of 14 April 1992 (provisional measures), Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America), ICJ 
Reports, 1992, p. 16, para. 42, and Order of 14 April 1992 (provisional measures), Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v 
United Kingdom), ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 113, para. 39.  
31 Kadi v Council and Commission (CFI), supra note 30 30, para. 231. 
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3.2 Diplomatic and Consular Law 
 
The CJEU has also dealt with the customary law status of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR),32 particularly those relating to the privileges and immunities of consular officers 
and consular employees. In Evans, AG Wahl found that the ICJ had not stated that the VCCR 
provisions reflect customary international law, but represent ‘principles which are deeply rooted in 
international law’.33 AG Wahl refers to the ICJ judgment in United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran,34 which sets out that the VCCR provisions ‘codify the law of diplomatic and consular 
relations, state principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peaceful relations between States 
and accepted throughout the world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions’.35 AG 
Wahl then found that Articles 48 and 71 of the VCCR on privileges and immunities represent 
customary international law. The question in this case related to the calculation of old age pension 
benefits for Ms Evans, who had been employed by the British Consulate General in Rotterdam. The 
Court looked at whether the provisions of the VCCR relating to the privileges of consular staff had 
the status of customary international law before the Convention had come into force for the 
Netherlands. Duquet notes that, unlike its sister convention, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations,36 the VCCR was not seen as a straightforward exercise of ‘codifying’ customary 
international law.37 This is evidenced by the fact, during the drafting of the VCCR, there was far less 
agreement among delegates on a disputed issues of consular law, contrary to the diplomatic law 
counterpart. While it is accepted by scholars that the VCCR represents customary international law, 
it is more disputed which articles have acquired customary status, and, as was important in this case, 
at which point in time. The Court adopted the position of AG Wahl, without any discussion of the 
negotiating history of the VCCR, and by merely mentioning the quoted passage from the Iran 
Hostages case. This is arguably an example of the CJEU going further than what the ICJ had stated, 
by finding that the VCCR, at the relevant time, had the status of customary international law. 
                                                 
32 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (24 April 1963) 596 UNTS 261, entered into force 19 March 1967. 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, Case C‑179/13, Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank v L.F. Evans,  
EU:C 2014:2015, para. 36.  
34 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3, para 45, cited in  Opinion 
of Advocate General Wahl, supra, footnote 18. 
35 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, supra note 33, para 36. 
36 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, entered into force 24 April 1964. 
37 S. Duquet, Oxford Reports on International Law, Commentary to ‘Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank 
v Evans, Judgment, C-179/13, ILEC 078 (CJEU 2015), 15th January 2015, Court of Justice of the European Union 
[CJEU]; European Court of Justice [ECJ]; European Court of Justice (5th Chamber)’ International Law in EU Courts 
(ILEC) <http://opil.ouplaw.com>. 
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Opinion 2/13 dealt with question of who was competent to conclude the EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (EUSFTA). 38 Was the EU competent to conclude the EUSFTA alone, or did the 
agreement also require the participation of the EU Member States?  One of the issues in this case 
dealt with the ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (‘ISDS’) mechanism in the agreement. Under the 
EUSFTA neither Party shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of 
a dispute which one of its investors and the other Party have consented to submit or has submitted to 
arbitration. The Council argued that the EU does not have competence to legislate in the field of 
diplomatic protection, as only the EU Member States had the competence to decide whether or not 
give diplomatic protection in a particular case. Advocate General Sharpston looked to the definition 
of diplomatic protection in international law. The opinion cited the International Law Commission’s 
2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection,39 the Permanent Court of International Justice,40 and 
the ICJ.41 Citing the ICJ’s Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United States of America), AG Sharpston 
found that it is a principle of customary international law that “before a State gives diplomatic 
protection to its injured nationals, those nationals must first have exhausted local remedies.”42  
In Hungary v. Slovakia43, the Court determined that privileges and immunities enjoyed by a Head of 
State were part of customary international law.44 However, the Court came to this conclusion without 
any analysis or references to international or domestic case law.  
 
3.3 Nationality and Citizenship  
 
The CJEU has also referred to ICJ jurisprudence relating to questions of nationality and citizenship. 
The CJEU has been instrumental in developing and defining the concept of EU citizenship. Yet the 
                                                 
38 Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2017:376. 
39 United Nations International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries (2006), 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session and submitted to the General Assembly as a part 
of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/61/10), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2006, vol. II, Part Two (‘UN ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’), Article 1 and Commentary on Article 1, para. 
2. 
40 Permanent Court of International Justice, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), PCIJ Reports, 1924, 
Series A, No 2, p. 12.  
41 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, 
judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at para 78. Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), 
Preliminary objections, Judgment of 21 March 1959, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 6, p. 27. 
42 Opinion 2/15, supra note 38, para 539. 
43 Judgment in Hungary v. Slovakia, C-364/10, EU:C:2012:630. 
44 Hungary v. Slovakia, supra note 43, para. 46: “[O]n the basis of customary rules of general international law … the 
Head of State enjoys a particular status in international relations which entails, inter alia, privileges and immunities.” 
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starting point of the Court is that international law and EU law leaves it to the state to decide the 
conditions regarding the acquisition of nationality. 
In Brouillard,45 the Belgian referring court sought guidance on whether the function of a legal 
secretary for the Cour de cassation should be considered ‘employment in the public service’, within 
the meaning of Article 45(4) TFEU. The CJEU considered its previous case law, including Alevizos,46 
a case dealing with an officer in the Greek Air Force who had been temporarily posted to North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). According to Article 45 (4) TFEU, the provisions on the free 
movement of workers do not apply to “employment in the public service”. This is based on the idea 
of “the existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties 
which form the foundation of the bond of nationality.”47 Advocate General Sharpston highlighted 
how this definition in EU law stems from the ICJ’s Nottebohm case.48 
The Nottebohm case is used as authority for the principle that the granting of nationality by  a state is 
only entitled to be recognised where there is a “genuine connection” between the individual and the 
State granting nationality. In this case, Liechtenstein was not able to take up a case against Guatemala 
based on the nationality of Mr Nottebohm (a German national who had obtained Lichtenstein 
nationality), because there had been no prior genuine link between Mr Nottebohm and Lichtenstein.49 
Nottebohm has been cited in a number of cases in support of this principle in the EU context.50 
The CJEU faced similar issues in Rottman.51 According to the CJEU’s case law, it is for the EU 
Member States, having regard to relevant Union law, to set out the conditions for the acquisition and 
loss of nationality.52 In this case, the Federal Administrative Court asked the CJEU whether a decision 
by a Member State on naturalisation that causes an EU citizen to lose his or her EU citizenship and 
renders them stateless, violates EU law. The CJEU found that the question falls within the ambit of 
Union law by virtue of the “nature and its consequences”.53 Whereas the CJEU did not examine 
international law when coming to this conclusion, Advocate General Maduro’s starting point was the 
                                                 
45 Judgment in Brouillard, C‑298/14, EU:C:2015:652. 
46 Judgment in Alevizos, C‑392/05, EU:C:2007:251, paragraphs 69 and 70. 
47 Alevizos, supra note 46, para. 70.  
48 Nottebohm, Judgment of 6 April 1955, Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4, at p. 23, cited in Opinion  of AG Shapston 
in Brouillard, C‑298/14, EU:C:2015:408, footnote 21. 
49 Nottebohm, supra note 48, para. 23. 
50 See Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Pereira Roque, C-171/96, EU:C:1997:425, para 31;  Hadadi, Opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott, Case C‑168/08, EU:C:2009:152, Advocate General Kokott referred to Nottebohm in 
reference to the principle that of priority of the more effective nationality, which has long been recognised in international 
law regarding the right of States to afford diplomatic protection (at para. 52). 
51 Judgment in Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern, C-135/08, EU:C:2010:104. 
52 Rottman, supra note 51, para 39.  
53 Rottman, supra note 51, para 42. 
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principle of international law that “questions of nationality are in principle within the reserved domain 
of States”. In this regard, AG Maduro cites the Permanent International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco54 and he Nottebohm case.55 
3.4 Law of the Sea 
 
The CJEU has also been an active court in the field of the law of the sea. On a number of occasions, 
the CJEU has been called upon to determine the customary law status of principles in this field. 
One of the most important cases in this field is Poulsen.56 Poulsen involved a challenge to EC 
legislation on the grounds that it violated international law of the sea. The Danish prosecutor brought 
proceedings against Poulsen on charges that they had transported and stored on board their vessel 
salmon caught in the North Atlantic, in contravention of an EC Regulation intended to protect fishery 
resources.57 The company that owned the vessel was registered in Panama, and the vessel was 
registered in Panama and flew the Panamanian flag. The master and crew were Danish, and the vessel 
was normally berthed in Denmark between voyages. The referring Danish Court asked whether 
Article 6 of the Regulation should be interpreted as applying to all nationals of the Member States, 
whatever the country in which the fishing vessel concerned is registered and whatever flag it flies, 
and regardless of where the vessel is located. The Court held that Article 6 of the regulation must be 
interpreted, and its scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea. 
The Court found this to include the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone58, the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas59  as well as the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.60 The Court found that a vessel registered in a non-
EC state could not be treated as a vessel with the nationality of an EC Member State on the ground 
that it has a ‘genuine link’ with that Member State. It also found that Community legislation could 
not be applied in respect to a vessel of a non-EC Member country in the exclusive economic zone of 
                                                 
54 See Advisory Opinion of 7 February 1923 on Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Series B No 4 (1923), 
p. 24, cited in Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern,  Case C‑135/08, 
EU:C:2009:588, para. 18. 
55 Nottebohm, supra note 48. 
56 Judgment in Anklagemindigheden v Poulsen and Diva Navigation, C-286/90, EU:C:1992:453. 
57 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 of 7 October 1986, laying down certain technical measures for the conservation 
of fishery resources (OJ 1986 L 288, p. 1). 
58 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (29 April, 1958) 516 UNTS 205, entered into force 10 
September 1964. 
59 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (29 April 1958) 559 UNTS 285, 
entry into force 20 March 1966. 
60 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force 16 November 
1994 (‘UNCLOS’). 
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a Member State as it enjoys freedom of navigation in that area. Under international law of the seas, a 
vessel in principle has only one nationality, that of the State in which it is registered. Nothing in the 
legislation suggested that the European Community intended to impose obligations on European 
Community nationals on the basis of personal jurisdiction. The Court found that there was nothing in 
the text or preamble of the Regulation in question that demonstrated that it was intended to apply on 
the basis of personal jurisdiction.  
This judgment is important insofar it states that the EU “must respect international law in the exercise 
of its powers”. The CJEU found that the Regulation in question “must be interpreted, and its scope 
limited, in the light of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea.”61 One of the questions in 
this regard was whether UNCLOS represented customary international law at the relevant time. In 
order to address this issue, the CJEU cited the ICJ cases in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in 
the Gulf of Maine Region;62 Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta);63 and 
Nicaragua v United States of America.64 The Court held that the EU must exercise its powers in 
conformity with customary international law.65 However, although the Court was quite thorough in 
its assessment of the state of international law of the sea, its engagement with the ICJ cases remains 
rather shallow.  
In Salemink66 the referring Court asked whether certain professional activity, which took place on a 
gas-drilling platform on the continental shelf adjacent to the Netherlands, outside the Netherlands’ 
territorial waters, was covered by EU law. The Court referred in this instance to the ICJ’s North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases67 and Article 77 of UNCLOS and determined that a Member State has 
sovereignty (although limited) over the continental shelf adjacent to it. The Court concluded that “[a] 
Member State which takes advantage of the economic rights to prospect and/or exploit natural 
resources on that part of the continental shelf which is adjacent to it cannot avoid the application of 
the EU law provisions designed to ensure the freedom of movement of persons working on such 
installations.”68 Work carried out at an offshore installation on the continental shelf should therefore 
be understood as having taken place within the territory of the Netherlands for the purposes of EU 
                                                 
61 Poulsen, supra note 56, para. 9.  
62 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Region ICJ [1984], p. 294, para. 94. 
63 Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) ICJ [1985], p. 30, para. 27. 
64 Nicaragua v United States of America,  substantive issues, ICJ [1986], p. 111-112, paras 212 and 214. 
65 B. Brandtner and H-P Folz, ‘The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey’ 4 European 
Journal of International Law (1993) 430, 442.  
66 Judgment in Salemink, C-347/10, EU:C:2012:17. 
67 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 8. 
68 Salemink, supra note 66, para. 36. 
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law. Similarly in Weber the Court held that “in the absence of any provision in the Brussels 
Convention governing that aspect of its scope or any other indication as to the answer to be given to 
this question, reference must be made to the principles of public international law relating to the legal 
regime applicable to the continental shelf and, in particular, the Geneva Convention…”69 In Salemink, 
the CJEU dealt with questions relating to the rules and principles of international law relating to the 
legal regime applicable to the continental shelf. The Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón also 
referenced the ICJ’s relevant case law. He argued that there is no separate definition of ‘EU territory’, 
and that the territorial scope of the EU Treaties can only be ascertained “within the framework of 
international law by means of treaties establishing boundaries.”70 The AG cited the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad71 to support the proposition that under international law: 
“[t]hat boundaries have greater permanence than the treaties which establish them shows the 
extraordinary importance of territorial limits as a factor in the stability of the international 
community.”72 In Weber, the CJEU also referred to the North Sea Continental Shelf cases when 
referring to the rights of the coastal state regarding the area of the continental shelf.73 
 
3.5 Jurisdiction and Territory 
 
The CJEU has dealt with ICJ case law when dealing with issues of jurisdiction and territorial scope 
of treaties.  
In Air Transport Association of America and Others (ATAA),74 the CJEU was called upon to decide 
whether an EU directive that the extended the EU’s scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading75 to international aviation was consistent with international law. The EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) applied to flights that arrive or depart from the territory of an EU Member State. It 
applied to the entire flight, even in cases where the majority of the flight took place outside the 
airspace of EU Member States. It was argued that the EU’s ETS was in violation of a number of 
international treaties, as well as customary international law binding upon the Union. In particular, it 
                                                 
69 Judgment in Weber, C-37/00, EU:C:2002:122, para. 31. 
70 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Salemink, C‑347/10, EU:C:2011:562, para. 43. 
71 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6. p. 37. 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Salemink, supra note 70, footnote 13. 
73 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 8, quoted in Weber, supra note, 69 para 34.  
74 Judgment in Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, C-
366/10, EU:C:2011:864 (‘ATAA’).  
75 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 25 OJ 
2003 L 275, p. 32, 25 October 2002. 
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was argued that the Directive violated customary international law based on its ‘extra-territorial 
effects’. 
ATAA gives some insight into how the CJEU decides whether a rule has customary international law 
status. First, the CJEU examines whether the customary rule in question is codified in an international 
treaty.76 In ATAA, the CJEU noted that the principles being invoked are enshrined in Article 1 of the 
Chicago Convention,77 Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the High Seas,78 
UNCLOS.79 Second, the Court refers to the jurisprudence of the ICJ80 and the PCIJ.81 Third, the Court 
takes into account whether any of the parties contested the existence of the rules of customary 
international law in their written observations or during court proceedings.82 The Court’s approach is 
less clear, however, when a rule’s customary status is contested. This was the case regarding the 
alleged principle “that aircraft overflying the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
State in which they are registered”.83 In ATAA, the Court did not conduct its own analysis of whether 
this was a principle of customary international law, but merely stated that “insufficient evidence exists 
to establish” that the principle of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction of vessels would apply by analogy 
to aircraft flying over the high seas.84 
Advocate General Kokott discussed the ICJ jurisprudence in more detail. First, Kokott referred to the 
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute to find that customary international law is one of the generally 
recognised sources of international law.85 Second, she refers to ICJ cases in order to introduce to the 
                                                 
76 See Judgment in Poulsen, supra note 61.  The Court took into account the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone UNTS vol 16; Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the High Seas, UNTS 
vol 450, p. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (29 April 1958) 559 
UNTS 285, entry into force 20 March 1966; and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 
1982) 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force 16 November 1994, “in so far as they codify general rules recognized by 
international custom”, para. 10.  
77 Convention on International Civil Aviation (signed 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947) 15 UNTS 295 
(Chicago Convention). 
78 Convention on the High Seas (done 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 11. 
79 ATAA, supra note 74, para. 104. 
80 ATAA, supra note note 74, para. 104. Judgment International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 392, 
paragraph 212. Kuijper notes that “Normally, the Court will adduce judgments of the ICJ in order to confirm that certain 
provisions of international conventions to which the EU is not a party are declaratory of customary international law.” 
P.J. Kuijper, ‘“It Shall Contribute to ... the Strict Observance and Development of International Law” The Role of the 
Court of Justice’ in A. Rosas, E. Levits, Y. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and 
Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2013) 597. 
81 ATAA, supra note 74, para. 104. Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 7 September 1927 in the 
Case of the S.S ‘Lotus’, PCIJ 1927, Series A, No 10, p. 25. 
82 ATAA, supra note note 74, para. 105. 
83 ATAA, supra note 74, para. 106. 
84 ATAA, supra note 74, para. 106. 
85 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, C-366/10, EU:C:2011:637, para. 115. 
 19 
two-element test, whereby “a settled practice on the part of the particular subjects of international law 
(consuetudo; objective element), which is recognised as a rule of law (opinio juris sive necessitatis; 
subjective element).”86 Note that AG Kokott refers to subjects of international law, not States, as the 
ICJ did. The Continental Shelf Cases to which the AG refers, mentions that “[t]he States concerned 
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.”87 In Nicaragua, 
to which the AG Kokott also refers, the ICJ said that “[t]he Court must satisfy itself that the existence 
of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.” In Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jarnahiriya/ Malta), the ICJ set out that “[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.”88 
Whether customary international law can be developed by legal subjects other than states is a matter 
of debate, one that has recently dealt with by the International Law Commission.89 It is interesting to 
see how the Advocate General takes a proposition established by the ICJ’s jurisprudence and subtly 
expands it to include other subjects of international law.  
The CJEU will more likely refer to ICJ judgments if they have been specifically mentioned in the 
pleadings of the parties. For instance, in Case C‑507/13 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 
the UK had argued that the Capital Requirements Directive IV, insofar it applied to employees of 
institutions located outside the EEA, violated principles of customary international law. The UK 
argued that the Directive, which was aimed at the remuneration of individuals employed within 
certain financial institutions, was invalid because as it applied ‘extraterritorially’, in violation of what 
the UK argued to be a principle of customary international law. Advocate General Jääskinen rejected 
this argument: “the United Kingdom would simply be wrong if it sought to claim that only territorial 
jurisdiction to legislate is permitted under international law.”90 AG Jääskinen discussed the ICJ cases 
referred to by the UK – Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, Nottebohm, Arrest Warrant, Lotus, and 
Barcelona Traction – and found that none of the authorities supported a principle of international law 
against extraterritoriality. 
 
                                                 
86 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 86, para 115.  
87 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 8, para 77. Emphasis added.   
88 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, 27. 
89 See, International Law Commission, Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, 
Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission Sixty-seventh session, Geneva, (4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 
2015), Un Doc A/CN.4/682. See further, J. Odermatt, ‘The Development of Customary International Law by International 
Organizations’ 22 International and Comparative Law Quarterly  2 (2017). 
90 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in UK v Parliament and Council, C‑507/13, EU:C:2014:2394, para 38.  
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4 The Law of Treaties 
 
The second area in which the CJEU has engaged with ICJ jurisprudence is in the field of the 
international law of treaties. As mentioned above, the CJEU does not apply the principles of the 
VCLT to interpret the EU Treaties, but has used those principles to interpret international agreements 
to which the EU is a party. Although the EU is not a party to the VCLT, the CJEU has found that 
such principles can be applied to the EU to the extent that they represent customary international law. 
4.1 Treaty Interpretation 
 
The main way in which the CJEU applies the VCLT principles is through treaty interpretation. Article 
31(1) VCLT sets out the general rule of treaty interpretation: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”91 The CJEU has also used article 31(2)(c), which states 
that an interpreting body may also take into account, for the purposes of interpretation “[a]ny relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”  
4.2 Preparatory Work 
 
The VCLT allows an interpreting body to take into account the preparatory work of the treaty as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.92 While the CJEU has been highly reluctant to employ 
travaux préparatoires in interpreting the EU Treaties or EU law, it has been somewhat open to 
examining preparatory work when interpreting international agreements. 
In Bolbol, the Advocate General went into quite some detail examining the drafting history behind 
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees.93 According to Ms Bolbol, 
a stateless Palestinian, the purpose of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention was to make clear that a 
person registered or entitled to be registered with United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), but residing outside the area in which UNRWA 
operates, should be automatically granted refugee status. AG Sharpston examined the travaux 
préparatoires related to the 1951 Convention and found that the drafting conference “had the situation 
in Palestine uppermost in its mind” when it drafted Article 1D. To support this interpretation, AG 
                                                 
91 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 1980 
(‘VCLT’). 
92 Article 32 VCLT.  
93 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bolbol, C-31/09, EU:C:2010:119, paras 41-47. 
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Sharpston took into account the fact that treaty provisions may be interpreted in light of the 
‘contemporaneous common will’ of the drafting parties, relying on the ICJ’s judgments in Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria94 and the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission, which refers to the Argentina/Chile Frontier Case.95 AG Sharpston also 
refers to the interpretive practices of other international dispute settlement bodies, which have taken 
into account the object and purpose of the treaty, in accordance with the rule of interpretation set out 
in the VCLT.96 AG Sharpston mentions that the ICJ has not yet ruled on the interpretation of Article 
1D of the 1951 Convention.97 Finally, the AG also mentioned that the ICJ when discussing the 
question whether UN General Assembly Resolutions should be considered ‘law’ sticto sensu. The 
AG noted that the question had not been resolved by the ICJ, and referred to the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion (1996).98 
The CJEU, however, did not examine the drafting history of the Convention, since it found the 
wording of Article 1D to be sufficiently clear.99 There are few occasions where the CJEU will use 
preparatory work to aid interpretation. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad case has been cited in 
support of the contention that travaux préparatoires constitute a supplementary source, whereas the 
treaty itself is the primary source for interpretation.100 Another reason for this reluctance stems from 
the CJEU’s general inclination towards teleological reasoning in EU law.101 However, it has been 
noted that the CJEU’s reluctance to refer to travaux préparatoires, both when dealing with 
international law and EU law, might be slowly waning, as preparatory materials are becoming more 
available.102 
                                                 
94 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 303, para. 59, quoted in Opinion 
of Advocate General Sharpston in Bolbol, supra note 93, at footnote 42. 
95 Decision on Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, delivered on 13 April 2002 by the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission at paragraphs 3.3, 3.4 and 3.13. 
96 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad, supra note 71 paragraph 41, cited at Bolbol, supra note 93, footnote 62.  
97 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bolbol, supra note  93, at 37. 
98 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, cited in 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bolbol, supra note 93, footnote 6.  
99 Judgment in Bolbol, C-31/09, EU:C:2010:351, para. 51. 
100 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio in Portugal v Council, C-149/96, EU:C:1999:92, para. 20. 
101 P.J. Kuijper, ‘The European Courts and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of 
Treaties Beyond the Geneva Convention (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 256, 260: “[t]here has always been a 
tendency at the Court to argue that the special character of the Community legal order required special, more teleologically 
oriented, interpretation methods than was usual in international law.”  C. Brölmann, ‘Specialized Rules of Treaty 
Interpretation: International Organizations’ in D. B. Hollis, Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012) 517: “in its (sparse) references to the rules of interpretation as part of the general law of treaties, the CJEU can be 
seen to employ a large degree of teleological reasoning coupled with a reluctance to use the travaux preparatoires as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.” 
102 See S. Miettinen and M. Kettunen, ‘Travaux to the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law’ 17 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2015) 145–167. 
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4.3 Subsequent practice  
 
Article 31 VCLT also allows an interpreting body to examine ‘subsequent practice’ of the parties to 
a treaty, which establishes an agreement regarding the treaty’s interpretation.103 As with preparatory 
work, the CJEU is reluctant to use subsequent practice of the parties to aid interpretation, both in EU 
law, and regarding international agreements. 
In Oberto (‘European Schools’), one of the questions dealt with by the CJEU was whether the 
subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty could override the terms of that treaty. The CJEU made 
a rather bold remark in this regard, stating that “as is clear from the case-law of the International 
Court of Justice, the subsequent practice followed in the application of a treaty may override the clear 
terms of that treaty if that practice reflects the parties’ agreement”.104 The CJEU cited the ICJ’s 1962 
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) for authority for that statement. The CJEU sought 
to interpret the Convention defining the Statute of the European Schools taking into account the 
‘subsequent practice’ of the parties. While an interpreting body may make recourse to the subsequent 
practice of the parties to ascertain the context, it is less clear whether such practice may override the 
clear terms of a treaty.  
In Front Polisario,105 AG Wathelet strongly criticized the CJEU’s approach in Oberto. First, he noted 
that the Preah Vihear case pre-dates the VCLT, and cannot be considered as concerning the 
interpretation of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, which did not exist at the time of the ICJ judgment. 
Moreover, AG Wathelet argues that there is nothing in Preah Vihear to support the CJEU’s bold 
assertion: “I cannot see anywhere in that judgment that the International Court of Justice held, 
whether expressly or not, that the subsequent practice followed in the application of a treaty could 
override the clear terms of that treaty.”106 He notes that the ICJ judgement concerned notions of 
estoppel or acquiescence in international law, and not subsequent practice. AG Wathelet was open to 
the idea that subsequent practice could override the terms of a treaty, but would set a very high bar 
for this: only in cases where it is “known to and accepted by the parties and is sufficiently widespread 
and sufficiently long term to constitute a new agreement in itself.”107 In Front Polisario, the CJEU 
found that the subsequent practice of the EU and Morocco relating to the interpretation of an 
                                                 
103 Art. 31 (2) (b) VCLT. See G. Slynn, ‘The Use of Subsequent Practice as an Aid to Interpretation by the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities’ in R. Bieber and G. Ress (eds) Die Dynamik des Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts 
(Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987) 138. 
104 Judgment in Oberto and O’Leary, Joined Cases C‑464/13 and C‑465/1, EU:C:2015:163, para. 61.  
105 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:677. 
106 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Front Polisario, supra note 105, para. 96 , para. 93. 
107 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Front Polisario, supra note 105, para. 96 (emphasis added).  
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Association Agreement could not override the terms of the treaty relating to the territorial application 
of that agreement. The CJEU dealt with a number of other public international law issues, including 
the right to self-determination, in the Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign108 cases. The 
CJEU’s approaches to international law, including references to ICJ jurisprudence has been discussed 
in more detail elsewhere.109 
4.4 Binding Unilateral Declarations 
 
The CJEU has also dealt with rather novel issues in the law of treaties. This was the case in 
Venezeualan Fisheries, where the question arose whether the EU had the capacity to make a ‘binding 
unilateral declaration’. It was uncontested that States could make such declarations, but unclear 
whether the EU has such capacity, and if so, which procedure under EU law would apply to the 
creation of such an instrument. The Commission argued that a unilateral binding declaration is 
essentially equivalent to an international agreement, relying on the ICJ’s Nuclear Tests case.110 
Advocate General Sharpston noted that the question of whether legal persons other than states, such 
as the EU, had the capacity to make such unilateral declarations, had not been decided by the ICJ, nor 
had it been dealt with by the ILC.111 AG Sharpston noted that, in accordance with the international 
law principle that obligations cannot be imposed upon a State without its consent, unilateral 
declarations are binding, even without the acceptance of another party. AG Sharpston refers in this 
regard to the ICJ’s Nuclear Tests judgment that dealt with unilateral declarations.112 
The case also dealt with the definition of a ‘treaty’ under public international law. AG Sharpston 
mentioned that the ICJ has suggested that the definition of a treaty in Article 2(1)(a) VCLT reflects 
customary international law, citing Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening). While the notion of a ‘treaty’ in international 
law and an ‘agreement’ in EU law are very similar, the case law shows that there is some slight 
difference between the two concepts. The EU tends to have a broader definition than in public 
international law. 
                                                 
108 Judgment in Western Sahara Campaign UK, Case C-266/16, EU:C:2018:118. 
109 See J. Odermatt, ‘Fishing in Troubled Waters: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-266/16, R (on the application of Western 
Sahara Campaign UK) v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs’ (2019) European Constitutional Law Review, 14(4), pp. 751–766; J. Odermatt, ‘Council of the 
European Union v. Front Populaire pour la Libération de la Saguia-El-Hamra et Du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) American 
Journal of International Law, 111(3), pp. 731–738. 
110 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Parliament and Commission v Council, Joined cases C-103/12 and C-
165/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:334, para. 34. 
111 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Parliament and Commission v Council, supra note 110, para. 85.  
112 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Parliament and Commission v Council, supra note 110, para. 34. 
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4.5 Fundamental Change in Circumstances  
 
Perhaps one of the most famous instances of the CJEU applying the international law of treaties was 
in the Racke case. In Racke,113 the CJEU relied on the ICJ’s judgment in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros114 
in support of its conclusion that the principle of fundamental change of circumstances is a customary 
law principle in the law of treaties. One of the questions in that case related to the termination of an 
agreement with Yugoslavia based on the rebus sic stantibus principle, and whether the outbreak of 
hostilities in Yugoslavia constituted a fundamental change of circumstances under Article 62 VCLT.  
The rebus sic stantibus principle was also mentioned in the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
cases. Commission v Austria and Commission v Sweden, dealt with the possible incompatibility 
between Union law and the bilateral investment treaties of EU Member States with third States. The 
defendant Member States Austria and Sweden argued that in case of conflict, there were existing 
mechanisms under public international law that would allow them to avoid applying their BITS, 
including relying on clausula rebus sic stantibus. The CJEU swiftly rejected these arguments.115 In 
Commission v Finland, which also dealt with Member State BITs, AG Sharpston also rejected the 
argument that the fundamental change of circumstances could be relied upon, citing the part of 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project quoted in Racke: “The negative and conditional wording of Article 
62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a clear indication moreover that the stability 
of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of circumstances be applied only in 
exceptional cases.”116  
5 The Development of Principles of EU Law 
 
Another way in which the CJEU has engaged with ICJ jurisprudence is more subtle: when the CJEU 
develops principles of EU law. In some cases, when developing a certain EU law principle, the CJEU 
acknowledges that it has origins in public international law. This is the case with regard to the 
principle of ‘good faith’ in EU law. It is interesting that the CJEU does not apply the principle of 
good faith as a principle of international law, but rather applies it as an EU law equivalent, the 
                                                 
113 Judgment in Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, C-162/96, EU:C:1998:293, para. 50. 
114 Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7. para. 104. 
115 Judgment in Commission v Austria, C‑205/06, EU:C:2009:118, paras 38-40, and Judgment in Commission v Sweden, 
C‑249/06, EU:C:2009:119,  paras 39-41. 
116 Judgment in Racke, supra note 113, para 50, quoted in Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Commission v 
Finland, C‑118/07, EU:C:2009:525, at footnote 33. 
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principle of legitimate expectations.117 De Baere and Roes have also argued that the duty of loyalty 
in EU law is an expression of the principle of good faith in international law.118 Rather than applying 
an existing international law principle, the CJEU created an EU law equivalent. This approach allows 
the Court to assert the autonomy of EU law – as it is an independent legal system that does not derive 
its authority from international law, it applies principles of EU law, even if those principles find their 
origin in earlier case law. 
The CJEU has found that “the principle of good faith is a principle of customary international law the 
existence of which has been recognised by the International Court of Justice” and is as such binding 
upon the European Union.119 The CJEU recognised the principle of ‘legitimate expectations’ as an 
EU expression of the principle of good faith in Opel Austria.120 In this case, Austria argued that the 
Council had acted in breach of the principle of good faith in international law when it adopted 
Regulation No 3697/93 imposing a 5.9% duty on gearboxes produced by General Motors Austria. 
Opel sought to annul the regulation on the basis inter alia that it violated the obligation under 
international law not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty before its entry into force. The CJEU 
found that the principle of good faith was a rule of general international law and thus binding upon 
the Community. It found this principle of good faith to be the public international law corollary of 
the EU law principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. The Court referred in this context 
to the decision of the PCIJ in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, in which the PCIJ 
indicated that a signatory state may be “under an obligation to abstain from any action likely to 
interfere with [the treaty’s] execution when ratification has taken place”.121 The CJEU found that 
there was a legitimate expectation on the part of traders such as Opel that the Council and other parties 
to the EEA Agreement would not act to defeat the object and purpose of that agreement. Interestingly, 
it was not the principle in Article 18 that gave rise to actionable rights, but the equivalent EU law 
principle regarding the protection of legitimate expectations. The Council Regulation was not 
annulled due to a deficiency stemming from public international law, but a violation of a principle of 
EU law. The Council argued that Article 18 VCLT and VCLT-IO only applied between sovereign 
                                                 
117 Judgment in Opel Austria v Council, T-115/94, EU:T:1997:3: “the principle of good faith is a rule of customary 
international law whose existence is recognized by the International Court of Justice [sic] (see the judgment of 25 May 
1926, German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ, Series A, No 7, pp. 30 and 39)  and is therefore binding on the 
Community.” (para. 90). “the principle of good faith is the corollary in public international law of the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations which, according to the case-law, forms part of the Community legal order.” (para 
93.) 
118 G. De Baere and T. Roes, ‘EU Loyalty as Good Faith’, 64 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 4 (2014) 829. 
119 Judgment in Tisza Erőmű kft, T‑468/08, EU:T:2014:235, para. 321. 
120 Judgment in Opel Austria v Council, supra note 117, para 90-93. 
121 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, (1925) PCIJ Ser A, No 7, 5. 
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states and international organizations and since they do not confer rights upon individuals, they could 
not be invoked in order to challenge the validity of EU acts.122 
Article 18 VCLT sets out an interim obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty; it is 
not intended to allow the provisions of the treaty to be valid prior to its entry into force.123 As Dörr 
puts it, “the States concerned are not bound to comply with the treaty, but not to destroy its very 
essence, thus not to render its entry into force de facto meaningless.”124 The interim obligation is thus 
concerned with acts that would make the performance of the treaty difficult or impossible. Did the 
Regulation in question really defeat the object and purpose of the EEA Agreement? One of the 
purposes of the Agreement was “[to establish] a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic 
Area.” It is doubtful that the EU’s behaviour threatened the Agreement in such a manner.125 Although 
Opel Austria is one of the very few judicial pronouncements on Article18 VCLT,126 it is not a real 
application of the interim obligation in international law, but an application of the more general 
principle of good faith.127 
Other cases demonstrate that the principle of good faith, not the Article 18 obligation, is applied by 
the CJEU. Cases such as Danisco Sugar,128 and Case T-231/04 Greece v. Commission129 involved 
arguments that there had been a breach of the principle of good faith in international law.130 Yet the 
cases show that it is the principle of legitimate expectations in EU law, rather than the Article 18 
VCLT interim obligation, that is being applied. Klabbers argues that in these cases, and others 
ostensibly involving the interim obligation, what is actually being applied is a ‘manifest intent’ test. 
131 Aust points out that “[t]here is virtually no practice in the application of [Article 18]”.132 It is 
doubtful whether these CJEU cases add to this international practice.  
                                                 
122 Judgment in Opel Austria v Council, supra note 117, para, 86. 
123 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn (CUP, 2013) 107. 
124 O. Dörr, ‘Article 18 - Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force’ in O. Dörr, 
K. Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Berlin, Springer, 2012), 220. 
125 See P. Fischer, ‘Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, Judgment of 22 January 1997, [1997] ECR II-39’, 35 
Common Market Law Review 3 (1998) 779.  
126 J. Klabbers, ‘Treaties, Conclusion and Entry into Force’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, < 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil>, para. 13. 
127 See Dörr, supra note 124, 222: “it becomes clear that the Court of First Instance was simply applying the good faith 
principle as such, and not the interim obligation as one of its concrete emanations.” 
128 Judgment in Danisco Sugar v Allmänna ombudet, C-27/96, EU:C:1997:563. 
129 Judgment in Greece v Commission, T-231/04, EU:T:2007:9. 
130 Judgment in Greece v. Commission, supra note 129, para. 71.  
131 131 J. Klabbers, ‘How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent’ 34 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2001) 283, 330. “if behavior seems unwarranted and condemnable, it may be 
assumed to have been inspired by less than lofty motivations and ought to be condemned, regardless of whether anyone’s 
legitimate expectations are really frustrated or can reasonably be said to have been frustrated, regardless of actual proof 
of bad faith.” 
132 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 1st edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 94. 
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Sometimes the CJEU chooses not to refer to the ICJ, but rather references its own case-law. As an 
example, in SECIL, Advocate General Wathelet discussed the principle of good faith in international 
law, quoting from the ICJ in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros judgment.133 The CJEU judgment, however, 
does not mention the ICJ. The CJEU states that Article 31 VCLT “provides in that respect that a 
treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.134 Rather than citing the ICJ, as the 
Advocate General does, it cites its own previous case law, namely the Brita judgment (and the case 
law it cites). In order to find authority for this principle of international law, the CJEU prefers to cite 
its own jurisprudence, rather than refer to another international court. In this way, the international 
law principle becomes internalised – it is no longer just a principle of international law, but one that 
has been integrated as a principle of EU law as well. 
The Court of First Instance (now: General Court) also dealt with the principle of good faith in Case 
T-231/04 Greece v. Commission.135 The Commission and certain Member States entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) related to the sharing of the costs of their representations in 
Abuja, Nigeria. The Commission took steps to recover amounts that it believed were due to be paid 
by Greece under the MOU and Greece disputed this amount. The Commission relied, inter alia, on 
the conduct of Greece and the principle of good faith in international law.136 The CFI noted that the 
principle of good faith is a rule of customary international law, which had been recognised by the 
PCIJ in German interests in Polish Upper Silesia.137 Thus Greece was bound to act in good faith 
regarding its other memorandum partners.138 Not only had Greece not informed the other parties of 
its intention to withdraw from the agreement, it continued to act as a full participant in the project. 
Therefore, “by reason of the principle of good faith, the Hellenic Republic could not evade its 
financial commitments by pleading that it had not ratified the additional memorandum.”139 On appeal, 
Advocate General Mazák referred to Australia v France (Nuclear Tests Case)140 to support the 
argument that the principle of good faith is “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source.”141 The CJEU found that the Court of First 
                                                 
133 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in SECIL, C‑464/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:52, para. 124.  
134 Judgment in SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, para. 94. 
135 Judgment in Greece v Commission, T-231/04, EU:T:2007:9. 
136 Judgment in Greece v. Commission, supra note 135, para. 71.  
137 German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, CPJI, Series A, No 7, pp. 30 and 39, quoted in Judgment in Greece v. 
Commission, supra note 135, para. 85.  
138 Judgment in Greece v. Commission, supra note 135, para. 97. 
139 Judgment in Greece v. Commission, supra note 135, para 99. 
140 ICJ, Australia v France (Nuclear Tests Case), ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253. 
141 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mazák in Greece v Commission, C-203/07 P, EU:C:2008:270, para. 79. 
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Instance was entitled to invoke the principle of good faith, “which forms part of general international 
law”.142 
6 Conclusion  
 
The relationship between the European Union and international law, or between the CJEU and the 
ICJ, is sometimes framed in terms of ‘coherence’ and ‘fragmentation’ of international law. Kassoti 
and Louwerse conclude that the CJEU, “rather than proffering its own interpretation  of international 
law, has consistently chosen to defer to the authority of the ICJ.”143 Rosas also argues that the CJEU 
has shown deference to the ICJ, partly because of the ICJ’s greater expertise and understanding of 
public international law issues.144 According to these authors, the CJEU’s references to the ICJ in this 
manner contribute to the coherence of international law and diminish risks of international law’s 
substantive fragmentation. The willingness of the CJEU to refer to the ICJ jurisprudence does tend to 
show a more open attitude towards international law. Indeed, there are no occasions where the CJEU 
and ICJ can be seen as diverging on public international law issues. This chapter has argued that the 
relationship is somewhat more complex than the CJEU showing deference to the ICJ.  
First, there are occasions where the CJEU could have referred to the ICJ or to public international 
law, but rather sought to resolve the issue on ‘EU ground’, rather than engaging with public 
international law. Take, for instance, the CJEU’s judgment in Wightman, a reference for a preliminary 
ruling on whether the United Kingdom would be able to revoke its notice of intention to leave the EU 
under Article 50 TEU. Much of the academic debate on this issue revolved around issues of public 
international law, especially Articles 65, 67 and 68 VCLT. The Opinion of Advocate General 
Sánchez-Bordona also discussed these provisions in detail, including references to ICJ 
jurisprudence.145 The CJEU, on the other hand, resolved the issue entirely within the confines of the 
EU Treaties, without utilising the VCLT or references to the ICJ. The Court found that its conclusion, 
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that a Member State could revoke its notification of intention to withdraw, “is corroborated by the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”.146 Here the CJEU is not diverging from 
the ICJ, but simply not engaging with it. This confirms a more general pattern whereby the Advocates 
General are much more likely to refer to ICJ cases than the Court. This does not mean necessarily 
that the Court disregards the ICJ in these instances, but that it implicitly accepts the AG’s arguments. 
There are few instances where the Court has taken a different path from that of the Advocate General 
on issues of international law. 
There are areas where ICJ case law is conspicuously absent. The ICJ is rarely mentioned, for instance, 
regarding principles of international responsibility. ICJ/PCIJ case law has been cited in passing to 
support the international law principle that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation in an adequate form.147 This absence of engagement with the ICJ in this field 
arguably demonstrates how the CJEU sees the system of responsibility in the EU context as distinct 
from that of international law. Similarly, the CJEU rarely refers to ICJ case law regarding the law of 
international institutions. 148 This also accords with the CJEU’s view that the EU legal order is an 
autonomous one, and law regarding international organizations is not generally applicable to that of 
the EU. 
Second, even where the CJEU and Advocates General refer to or engage with ICJ jurisprudence, the 
CJEU may nevertheless put its own spin on international law issues. This is understandable given the 
very different functions of international law before the two courts. The CJEU is focused on resolving 
questions of EU law – public international law is thus dealt with as a subsidiary means of interpreting 
and applying EU law and the EU Treaties. Just as light is distorted as it passes through glass, 
international law and ICJ jurisprudence is modified as it passes through the prism of EU law. It may 
appear, therefore, that the CJEU’s references to ICJ jurisprudence contribute to the unity and 
coherence of international law – but upon closer inspection, there are subtle changes that take place 
when passing through this prism.  
Third, this research shows how issues of public international law can be slowly transformed into 
issues of EU law, and that references to ICJ jurisprudence will be replaced by previous CJEU 
                                                 
146 Judgment in Wightman, Case C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999 para. 69. Emphasis added.  
147 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Brasserie du pêcheur, C-46/93, EU:C:1995:407, para. 38, referring to Case 
concerning the Factory at Chorzów, CPGI, Series A, p. 21 and Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950 on the interpretation 
of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, CGI, 1950, p. 228. (Emphasis added). 
148 Advocate General Bobek examined practice regarding access to judicial documents in the EU Member States as well 
as the practice of international courts, in Case C‑213/15 P Commission v Patrick Breyer, EU:C:2016:994, para 110.  AG 
Bobek looked at the ICJ, among other international courts, and Article 53 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court, which provides 
that the Court may make pleadings and documents available, upon ascertaining the views of the parties. 
 30 
judgments. It is interesting to see how concepts that originate in public international law, such as 
those relating to nationality, can be transformed into principles of EU law. The principle of good 
faith, a recognised principle of customary international law, is transformed and given expression as 
EU law principles, such as loyalty and the protection of legitimate expectations. Once transformed 
into principles of EU law, the CJEU can then interpret and apply these principles autonomously, 
without the need to refer to the ICJ jurisprudence. By using public international law principles to 
develop concepts of EU law, the CJEU still has a subtle effect on the development of international 
law. 
The courts of The Hague and Luxembourg operate in very different worlds. Yet the CJEU is no 
longer, if it ever really was, solely an economic court, and now deals with questions related to 
sovereignty, the law of the sea, migration, trade, sanctions and terrorism.  These issues, by their very 
nature, touch upon questions of public international law. One might expect that as the EU becomes 
more globally active, and that more cases deal with public international law issues, the CJEU would 
also cite and discuss ICJ jurisprudence. The other trend, however, is towards the CJEU asserting the 
autonomy of EU law, especially towards the international legal order. This means that the CJEU will 
refer to the ICJ, but that it will have a relatively minor role in the CJEU’s legal reasoning. It may be 
used to fill gaps, or to support certain legal arguments, but it is not followed as if it were a 
hierarchically superior court. Moreover, it should be noted that the CJEU’s practice of citing ICJ 
jurisprudence is far from consistent. Whether the ICJ is mentioned at all appears to depend on the 
preference of the judges or Advocates General, or whether the parties to the case used ICJ judgments 
in their legal argumentation.  
The ICJ is mainly referred to in three main ways: to support the existence of a rule of customary 
international law, to identify rules of treaty interpretation, and to develop principles of EU law. 
Whereas the ICJ contributes to the universality and general application of international law, the CJEU 
is much more focused on preserving the integrity and autonomy of the EU legal order. The CJEU and 
Advocates General occasionally refer to ICJ judgments, but this is not done habitually, and principles 
that are developed at the international level can soon be absorbed into the EU legal order. Yet if the 
EU is to truly respect international law in the exercise of its powers, and to uphold and enforce 
international law, this will require a more thorough engagement with the ICJ’s reasoning, rather than 
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